preprint · techrxiv · 2025

Simulated Minds, Artificial Consciousness, and the Theory-Relative Simulation Hypothesis

abstract

Examines the simulation hypothesis and claims about artificial consciousness through one observation: any verdict about whether a simulated mind is genuinely conscious depends on which theory of consciousness one assumes from the outset. The paper develops this theory-relative reading and traces what it does to familiar arguments about simulated minds — many disagreements turn out to be disagreements about theories of mind, not about the simulations themselves.

@misc{nguyen2025simulated,
  author = {Nguyen, Michel},
  title = {Simulated Minds, Artificial Consciousness, and the Theory-Relative Simulation Hypothesis},
  year = {2025},
  howpublished = {TechRxiv},
  doi = {10.36227/techrxiv.176583724.41540320/v1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.176583724.41540320/v1}
}